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Policy bullet points 
 Very little is known about the local decision-making processes related to the 
initiation or not of Social Impact Bond (SIB) financed interventions - but we know 
that many proposed SIB financed interventions are not initiated. 
 This study explores these decision-making processes and compares a SIB financed 
intervention that was initiated with one that was not initiated.  
 The study increases empirical understanding of these phenomena and highlights the 
theoretical utility of a decentred governance approach to explain why it can be 
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We explore the development of two proposed Social Impact Bond (SIB) financed 
interventions in health care in the English National Health Service (NHS). This is important 
because very little is known about the processes involved in the localised development of 
these nascent financing mechanisms. We apply a ‘decentred’ approach to network 
governance to the case studies – one in which a SIB financed intervention was initiated and 
another in which it was not. We find that moving from the prevailing competitive quasi-
market NHS commissioning traditions to new forms of integrated commissioning may 
require a more collaborative approach to service procurement than has typically been the case 






Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are a new mechanism for the commissioning, upfront financing 
and delivery of public services drawing on some non-government funds and using outcomes-
based contracts. The UK is a global leader in the development and implementation of SIBs. 
Several central government departments in England have fostered SIB development – for 
example, the Ministry of Justice enabled the world’s first SIB at Peterborough Prison (Disley 
et al, 2015) and the Department of Work and Pensions has established several pilot SIB 
projects focusing on Youth Engagement, Training and Employment (DWP, 2014). In 2013, 
nine varied projects received central government ‘seed funding’ via the Department of Health 
to explore the potential for SIB application to health and social care in the English NHS. This 
funding allowed projects, often led by service providers at the invitation of commissioners, to 
obtain support from intermediary organisations - new actors with specialist knowledge in SIB 
development offering advisory services and liaison between investors, commissioners and 
service providers - for the local design and negotiation of potential SIBs.  
 
As part of a broader evaluation (The Authors, 2018), we followed the progress of these nine 
proposed projects from 2014-17. Five of the proposed projects were initiated as SIB financed 
interventions whilst four were not. In this paper we qualitatively explore two of these projects 
in detail – one which was initiated as a SIB and one which was not - in order to illuminate the 
reasons why SIB financed interventions may or may not be initiated. This is important 
because there is little knowledge of the reasons why proposed SIB projects are, or are not 
initiated. Furthermore, this is not an issue confined to these health and social care projects. 
We know, for example, that of the 62 areas that received grants to develop SIBs as part of the 
Commissioning for Better Outcomes Fund in the UK launched in 2014, 37of those decided 
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against launching a SIB financed intervention. (Ecorys and PIRU, 2017). Additionally, many 
proposed SIB projects receive public subsidies and other forms of quasi-public funding in the 
UK, to help with their establishment, so understanding why some do not proceed may help 
inform future decisions of grant-makers. Moreover, many of the SIBs which are initiated 
suffer long delays in set up and implementation (Tan et al, 2015). These delays are often due 
to the complexities involved in establishing new contractual agreements, performance 
metrics, and distributing risk and accountability across often new networks of organisations 
and individuals (Disley et al, 2015; Social Finance, 2011; Rudd et al, 2013; McKay, 2013; 
Pauly and Swanson, 2013; DWP, 2014; Tan et al, 2015). Therefore, reflections on why SIBs 
may not be initiated, or run into delays may be of practical use to interested parties and policy 
makers. Beyond these empirical concerns, there are also important theoretical questions 
posed by SIBs for public policy and management studies linked to how SIBs may impact 
upon notions of governance (Fox & Albertson, 2011; Warner, 2013; Joy & Shields, 2013; 
McHugh et al, 2013; Fraser et al, 2016). In the following section, we firstly describe what a 
SIB is, then briefly discuss the recent research literature into SIBs and introduce our 
analytical approach.  
 
Social Impact Bonds: What they are and what we know 
 
SIBs usually involve four different parties. Firstly, commissioners – these are normally 
central or local government bodies responsible for ensuring relevant public services are made 
available to target populations. Secondly, service providers – who are often drawn from the 
charity sector and will deliver the interventions commissioned. Thirdly, we find external 
investors who provide (all or some of) the upfront costs of service provision, in exchange for 
a commitment by commissioners to re-pay their initial investment plus a return if pre-defined 
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target outcomes are achieved. The final party may be referred to as specialist intermediaries 
(GO Lab, 2017), involved in developing the project, securing the relevant contracts amongst 
the respective parties, facilitating investment and managing the delivery of the project.  
 
There is a limited but growing empirical literature that focuses on aspects of SIB 
implementation. This consists mainly of reports commissioned by governments and 
consultancies – seeking to highlight the practical policy lessons to be learned from SIB 
projects (Disley et al, 2015;Social Finance, 2011; Rudd et al, 2013; Tan et al, 2015; DWP, 
2014; The Authors, 2018). These reports are almost exclusively qualitative and highlight 
many of the practical challenges involved in initiating SIBs such as high transaction costs, 
complexity in contractual negotiations and the need to avoid adverse behaviours, such as 
‘cream-skimming’ (i.e. focusing on those members of the client group that are most likely to 
generate outcomes with minimal effort) or ‘parking’ (i.e. putting aside difficult cases that are 
unlikely to generate outcomes payments). A further subset of work focuses more intently on 
how and why actors might decide not to pursue a SIB mainly due to a misalignment of actor 
interests (McKay, 2013; Pauly and Swanson, 2013; Giacomantonio, 2017). Whilst useful, 
such studies frequently fail to engage with potentially relevant theoretical public policy and 
management literature and theories of governance as well as with empirical data.   
 
Away from a specific focus on work exploring why SIB financed interventions may not be 
initiated, a recent literature review on SIBs in general in high-income settings identified three 
emergent narratives. Firstly, a public sector reform narrative located within wider New Public 
Management (NPM) theory (Ferlie et al, 1996). Secondly, a private financial sector reform 
narrative concerned with promoting Social Entrepreneurship. Thirdly, a cautionary narrative 
sceptical of SIBs, and other public and financial sector developments such as NPM and 
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Social Entrepreneurship. This review found that much of the work available on SIBs consists 
of commentaries in the ‘grey’ literature, often produced by interested parties pursuing reform 
agendas that focus on the proposed benefits of SIBs, accompanied by a smaller, more critical, 
predominantly academic, literature (Fraser et al, 2016).     
 
Proponents of SIBs frequently draw on the public sector reform and private financial sector 
reform narratives to argue that SIBs provide ‘win-win’ solutions to ingrained public policy 
problems through improved provider performance and better outcomes for specific 
population groups, by transferring both the risk of failure and the need to provide up-front 
finance for service delivery away from public commissioners to private investors (Cohen, 
2011). Further recent work has emphasised how SIBs can encourage better contract 
management between government and providers (Government Performance Lab, 2017). 
Conversely, critics of SIBs argue that claims of their effectiveness remain unfounded, that 
SIBs may prove costlier than traditional financing methods for public commissioners and that 
they may ultimately fail to transfer risk from the public to the private sector (McHugh et al, 
2013; Warner, 2013;). 
 
A number of these more critical academic authors draw on theories derived from the wider 
governance and management literature. Warner (2013) argues that SIBs may be seen to 
represent an extension of certain logics of the NPM – underlined by a reliance on contracting 
mechanisms through which significant control over service delivery is ceded by the public 
authority to intermediary organisations who implement an increased performance 
management regime (Warner, 2013). In contrast, Fox and Albertson (2011) highlight SIBs’ 
potential to lessen some of the harsher edges of NPM as they are intended to shift the focus 
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from process measurement to outcomes measurement. Joy and Shields (2013) suggest that, 
rather than the NPM, SIBs may be more accurately seen as a manifestation of what Osborne 
(2006) terms the post-NPM, New Public Governance (NPG) paradigm which emphasises a 
move in public management towards re-integration of public service commissioning and 
provision, requiring closer collaboration between commissioners and providers across public, 
private and not for profit sectors, and a diminution in the reliance on NPM style competitive 
contracting. 
 
SIBs may also be seen as a variant of a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) – the virtues of 
which are contested. Warner (2013) highlights that, in the American experience, inducements 
seen as essential to attracting private investors to PPPs, such as confidentiality agreements 
and guaranteed market share ultimately serve to ‘undermine the market competition basis on 
which efficiency claims are made’ (Warner, 2013; p308). Whilst Warner suggests that SIBs 
as a form of PPP may have the potential to avoid some of the worst problems identified with 
infrastructure PPPs in the US, overall, she advocates a cautionary approach to the uptake of 
SIBs.  Proponents of PPPs suggest that they promote long-term collaborations between public 
and private players that are ‘working arrangements based on a mutual commitment (over and 
above that implied in any contract) between a public sector organisation with any 
organisation outside of [the] public sector’ (Bovaird, 2004; p199 – quoted in Teicher et al, 
2006 p87). In this way ‘PPPs overcome the problems associated with agency and transaction 
cost theories (with their focus on legal contract specifications) by moving to relational 
contracts based on trust and shared understanding of the wider goals required of the service’ 
(Teicher et al, 2006; p87). From this perspective, SIBs can be seen as part of a wider shift to 
‘neo-corporatist values’ (Osborne, 2006) in the commissioning and delivery of public 
services in that they are likely to require collaborative co-design of complex care pathways 
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and sustained commitments from key actors (providers, commissioners, intermediaries and 
investors).  Such a perspective suggests that SIBs represent movement towards trust-based 
regimes of governance – aligning more closely in theoretical terms to the NPG (Joy & Shield, 
2013; Osborne, 2006) and implicitly challenging the competitive logic of the quasi-market in 
English health care commissioning, and the NPM’s focus on contracting and performance 
management regimes, highlighted by Warner (2013). 
 
Thus, there are interesting questions emerging about whether SIBs challenge or reinforce 
existing governance logics for actors, institutions and networks involved in experimenting 
with this new commissioning tool. These questions relate to logics of competition and 
collaboration.Developing a SIB at the local level frequently involves the cultivation of new 
relationships between actors and the establishment of new networks for service delivery in 
response to existing and emerging policy problems (Government Performance Lab, 2017). 
This in turn may strain (or conversely, it may strengthen) existing relationships and network 
governance  
 
Beyond SIB specific work there is an extensive literature on network governance and its 
implications for public management (Newman, 2001; Dunleavy et al, 2006; Stoker, 2006; 
Osborne, 2006). Newman (2001) in particular has highlighted how governance consists of 
multiple and conflicting strands, simultaneous upwards and downwards flows of power and 
disparate forms of power/knowledge. These flow within and across organisations as they 
negotiate interdependent relationships (p38). We explore how network governance is actively 
created by local actors in two specific sites in this paper.  
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To do this, we are influenced by a ‘decentred’ theory of network governance (Bevir & 
Rhodes, 2007; Bevir & Richards, 2009). This approach encourages an exploration of how 
‘new patterns of rule, including institutions and policies, are created, sustained, and modified 
by individuals. It encourages recognition that the actions of these individuals are not fixed by 
institutional norms or a logic of modernisation, but arise from the beliefs individuals adopt 
against the background of traditions and in response to dilemmas’ (Bevir & Rhodes, 2007; 
p6). Thus it is through ‘ideas’ that individuals and groups make sense of the world around 
them. ‘Situated agents’ act on ideas and may elevate ideas into new ‘beliefs’ over time. 
‘Practices’ are what Bevir’s approach (Geddes, 2014) refers to as the sets of actions pursued 
by actors – these are influenced by their beliefs. Within organisations and across networks, 
these practices come to be viewed as ‘traditions’ – or the accepted ways of doing things. In 
this way ‘traditions are the ideational background within which agents find themselves’ 
(Geddes, 2014; p5). It is from these traditions that agents select their broad beliefs concerning 
the appropriateness of certain actions. In turn, these beliefs may change when having to 
confront ‘dilemmas’. A dilemma can be posed by an idea which - if it stands in contradiction 
to another established belief, practice, or tradition - poses a problem for individuals or 
groups. Such dilemmas can only be resolved by either accommodating or discarding the new 
idea (Bevir & Rhodes, 2007; Geddes, 2014). This is the first paper to explicitly draw on a 
decentred approach to the study of Social Impact Bonds and encourages a contextually-
focused ‘bottom-up’ approach.  
 
A key role of the SIB mechanism may be to challenge the status quo ante (Cohen, 2011;). In 
this sense the policy may represent a ‘disruptive innovation’ in that it may challenge existing 
actors (commissioners, providers, and other interested parties) to rethink their existing 
practices (i.e. ways to manage, or govern specific policy problems or perceived social, 
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clinical and operation failures) through the introduction of new ideas. In our two selected 
cases we explore in detail if, how, when, and why the local networks of actors encountered 
dilemmas associated with the process of developing, commissioning and initiating the 
respective SIB financed interventions, how these interacted with their existing traditions, 
beliefs and their situated agency. We discuss how traditions and networks of actors interact to 




Research Design & data collection 
We draw on comparative case study methods (Yin, 2013; Eisenhardt, 1989) to explore the 
perceptions and narratives offered by key actors of the processes involved in developing local 
services through a SIB mechanism across the two selected case study sites. Qualitative case 
studies are an appropriate method for exploring issues related to policy implementation (Pope 
and Mays, 1995), exploring ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions about phenomena through detailed 
contextualised accounts of cases (Yin, 2013). We undertook qualitative documentary analysis 
of relevant policy documents (both local and national) and conducted interviews with 
relevant actors before and after the decisions were made to initiate the respective services 
through a SIB (or not).  
 
We conducted 29 interviews overall (10 in Site A and 19 in Site B over 2014-17). We 
purposively sampled informants to include commissioner, intermediary, provider, legal and 
management consultancy viewpoints. Most interviews lasted an hour. We used an interview 
schedule that asked informants about their professional background, work history, an 
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overview of their understanding of the proposed intervention and their understanding of the 
SIB financing mechanism. We discussed prospective opportunities and challenges faced in 
SIB development whilst allowing informants the space to express their own narratives 
(Fontana and Frey, 2000). In both sites, informants were asked to reflect on the extent to 
which they could promote or inhibit the update of a SIB in their local area.  In keeping with 
the decentred approach, informants were asked to explore whether the proposed SIBs 
identified current problems, challenged established ways of delivering solutions to problems 
and offered new ways of delivering services.  
 
Data analysis  
Interview transcripts were coded using NVivo 10 (QSR International, 2009). Initial codes 
were based on themes arising directly from the interview questions including: measurement, 
complexity, competition, risk, trust, and collaboration. We developed case study reports for 
each site. Three members of the research team analysed data collaboratively to ensure inter-
coder reliability and interrogated the data repeatedly in order to understand the reasons for the 
decision not to contract public services through a SIB mechanism at each site. Through this 
process we developed secondary codes related to the ‘situated agency’ of the actors, the 
existing ‘traditions’ they identified and the ‘dilemmas’ they acknowledged around their work 
to initiate a SIB (Bevir & Rhodes, 2007; Bevir & Richards, 2009) closely engaging with the 




The findings section is divided into three parts. First we introduce the two case study sites 
and highlight the local policy failures that the proposed SIB financed interventions aimed to 
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remedy. We then present the narratives or stories that emerged from each case study in turn 
to explain why each proposed project was initiated or not.  
 
Problems, failures, dilemmas. 
 
In both sites, the local actors identified two distinct existing local policy problems, or failures 
which prompted the local interest in developing a SIB financed intervention. The first of 
these may be labelled a service failure. The service failures identified in each site 
respectively highlighted historic local deficiencies in social, clinical and operational terms. 
Secondly, actors identified a finance failure –highlighting an inability to finance solutions to 
the respective service failures at speed or scale (see table 1): 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The focus in Site A was End of Life Care services. Local healthcare commissioners there had 
reviewed the local End of Life Care provision and identified high levels of fragmentation in 
its existing form and recommended redesign. Various clinical and operational problems were 
identified that had negative impacts on patients – for example, unplanned hospital admissions 
in the final weeks of life, and higher levels of death in hospital - as opposed to death at home 
or in hospice care,  which is often preferred by terminal patients and their families. It was 
also the case that poorly coordinated End of Life Care led to higher overall costs for the local 
healthcare economy than might have been expected from a better coordinated service. 
Concurrent to, yet separate from these local discussions about the End of Life Care problems 
in Site A, other national English NHS and charitable sector providers were in discussions 
about developing a SIB financed intervention to be applied to healthcare. Rather fortuitously, 
these organisations chose to focus on End of Life Care. A commissioner in Site A learned of 
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these developments and this led to a successful application for ‘seed funding’ to support 
collaborative work towards an End of Life Care focused SIB in Site A with support from the 
aforementioned SIB intermediary organisation and the national NHS bodies and charitable 
sector provider.  
 
Site B’s SIB proposal was focused on better self-management of long-term conditions 
through Social Prescribing Services (i.e. non-medical interventions in the local community to 
foster sustained healthy behaviours). Social Prescribing has a long and well established 
history in Site B. For over twenty years, local actors, drawn from medical, academic and 
voluntary backgrounds, had been experimenting with Social Prescribing interventions to try 
and encourage local people with long-term health conditions to improve their social 
wellbeing and clinical conditions.  It was hoped that by increasing access to Social 
Prescribing Services local healthcare services would benefit through reduced emergency and 
unplanned hospital admissions. This would not only have clinical and operational benefits, 
but would also deliver hypothetical cost savings to the local healthcare economy.   A local 
umbrella charity with a long interest in Social Prescribing learned about the potential of SIB 
financing through an intermediary organisation and entered into discussions with local 
healthcare commissioners and investment managers (based in a different city) to explore the 
potential of SIB financing to develop these ideas – again, aided by ‘seed funding’ from 
national government. In both Sites A and B, this initial ‘seed funding’ was shared amongst 





Both sites identified different local service failures, which had negative social, clinical and 
operational impacts on their local populations and on health services as a whole. These 
failures were attributed to poor integration of existing services, inadequate overall planning 
and deficient communication between different service silos in the local NHS infrastructure. 
Given this, the SIB mechanism is attractive as it not only provides access to supplementary 
up-front finance, but also encourages early and consistent integrated discussions amongst a 
new network of actors including (existing and new NHS, third sector and potentially private) 
provider organisations, local healthcare commissioners, relevant national actors, SIB 
intermediary organisations, investment managers and lawyers. However, NHS 
commissioning has since the early 1990s been structured through established ‘traditions’ of 
quasi-marketised managed competition. (Ferlie et al, 1996). These firmly established rules, or 
norms have come to discourage integrative multi-actor service redesign at the local level as 
such interactions may presage perceived and actual conflicts of interest when services are put 
out to competitive tender. As  we will show, the inherent shift within SIB development 
processes towards greater collaboration in the design and commissioning of solutions to 
entrenched social problems led to local ‘dilemmas’ for actors in both Sites A and B by 
challenging their ‘traditional’ beliefs about the guiding principles behind their commissioning 
practices (Bevir & Rhodes, 2007) . In the next sections, we highlight the ways in which 
network governance is locally created, negotiated and reproduced through the narratives of 
the different situated agents involved in these proposed SIB financed interventions as we 
present the ‘stories’ that developed in each of the chosen  sites and explore these ‘dilemmas’ 
further.  
 




The networks of actors in Sites A and B had many similarities as well as significant 
differences. The network in Site A was newer, had a wider selection of actors from more 
diverse institutional backgrounds and organisations and was less established than that in Site 
B. End of Life Care had been on the agenda of local actors in Site A for a shorter time than 
Social Prescribing had been under discussion by the local network in Site B. Nonetheless, 
actors at Site A reflected upon positive, promising early interactions between the different 
organisations during the initial period of local SIB development. The overall narrative that 
emerges around these early interactions is a positive one. In 2013, healthcare commissioners, 
local NHS hospitals, a large national cancer and palliative care focused charity, a firm of 
public sector legal specialists, an intermediary organisation and representatives from national 
NHS support organisations started work to review the service design of End of Life Care in 
Site A. Over the course of a year, these actors developed a network and worked 
collaboratively to engage other interested parties – including existing private and charitable 
local hospice provider organisations delivering End of Life Care services and the wider 
public, through a series of local events.  
 
A dedicated project team sat at the heart of the network to lead on the proposed SIB 
development work. The project team reviewed the relevant literature and developed potential 
care models and funding arrangements for a new End of Life Care service in Site A. They 
selected a model that was used for the original pre-qualification questionnaire to be issued in 
accordance with NHS commissioning standard procedures. However, before this 
questionnaire was issued, there was a fundamental breakdown in the constitution and 
functioning of this recently established network. Having collaboratively designed the service 
model to be put out to tender, three partners, integral to this well-functioning network: the 
SIB intermediary, a large charity and a local NHS partner organisation, informed the 
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commissioners that they intended to collectively bid for the contract to deliver the service in 
Site A.  This came as a shock to the commissioners who had not anticipated this scenario: 
‘[A member of the charity organisation] said “Well you know we’ll bid for this when 
it comes up”, and I said “But you can’t, you know there’s a huge conflict of interest 
here”, and I said… “[E]ssentially you’ve developed this model with us, you’ve got all 
the insider information, the highs, the lows, the data, the lot”.’ 
Commissioner, Site A 
This turn of events damaged relationships within the network. The SIB intermediary 
organisation and the respective NHS and charitable provider organisations chose to ‘step 
away’ from their collaborative work with the commissioner - thus splintering the network of 
actors working on the project: 
‘So we formed ourselves into one of the potential provider [groups], so we then had to 
move away from the preparation of the process.  Of course, that’s absolutely 
classically right from a procurement point of view, but of course what it did is it then 
left [others in the network] to do their own thing… I’m sure that reduced its chance of 
success in that people would be involved in driving and working together as a team, 
that thing is then broken up, they’re starting again.’ 
Provider, Site A 
A further problem was linked to incumbent local providers’ concerns about losing existing 
contracts should the new service be commissioned along SIB lines.  This was because the 
SIB project encouraged a larger provider with greater resources, not previously active in the 
region to bid for local services.  This perception of greater and potentially unfair competition 
facing existing providers through the new involvement of a much bigger, national provider 
added to the strains on actors within the network:  
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‘[Existing providers] thought they would lose some business and were very anxious 
and were breathing down the necks of the [commissioners] at every stage’ 
Provider, Site A 
All actors involved in Site A referred to deep ‘difficulties’ within the relationships between 
agents and organisations, particularly as they related to reconciling perceptions of fairness, 
propriety and balancing the goals of competition and collaboration in the processes of service 
design and the eventual commissioning process in this network. These relationship 
difficulties posed significant problems for the governance of the SIB development process. 
Existing local providers felt threatened by the new external actors who they perceived to be 
too close to the commissioning actors. The commissioners in turn felt that the actions of the 
actors who were ‘stepping away’ were problematic.  Whilst ‘stepping away’ might be seen as 
the right thing to do in terms of commissioning processes – it did little to assuage the existing 
providers of their concerns around perceived conflicts of interest given the detailed 
knowledge these actors had due to their involvement in the design of the proposed service 
model. 
 
The degree of collaboration required to design this SIB financed intervention posed a 
dilemma (Bevir & Rhodes, 2007) for actors in the network in relation to how to commission 
the intervention in a competitive, and ‘fair’ way – i.e. one without the perception of conflicts 
of interest identified above. In response to this dilemma some actors within the network used 
their situated agency to emphasise probity, distance and rigidity of legal process in terms of 
the process towards the commissioning of the service in the following stages whilst other 
actors complained about impossibility of delivering a ‘fair’ commissioning process. As a 
whole, the network remained very keen to demonstrate that a robust competitive tendering 
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process for the new End of Life Care service would take place, and that all parties would 
maintain the appropriate detachment from each other. Actors within the network sought to 
resolve the dilemma posed by the SIB requirement for collaborative service design by 
emphasising traditional strategies of cross-organisational distancing and signalling an 
ongoing belief in the fairness of an established managed competitive approach to service 
commissioning. 
 
Ultimately, this strategy floundered. Just two returns met the pre-qualification questionnaire 
criteria (hardly the flourishing competition hoped for by many in the network). Furthermore, 
between the pre-qualification questionnaire being issued and the invitation to tender, a review 
of the original metrics drawn up on the service model was commissioned. This review by the 
commissioners found that the metric linked to the number of unplanned admissions to 
hospital in the last month of life had been incorrectly calculated in the original work, and 
therefore the activity in year one of the proposed contract should be measured instead, and 
subsequent metrics for years two and three be based on year one data. For the two potential 
bidders, this then caused confusion about firstly, risk exposure; and secondly, the ability to 
make a return on any investment given the likely tighter margins. The commissioners had 
instigated a closed bid process which precluded detailed negotiations with bidders around 
their respective bids. A bid led by one group was abandoned due to this confusion. A second 
group went ahead with a bid – however, it was deemed non-compliant by the commissioners. 
In light of not receiving a single compliant bid, the commissioners discontinued further work 
on the SIB. They cancelled the original procurement processes for the respective elements of 
the End of Life Care, and commenced a new open procurement process to provide similar 




Site B: network narratives of promise and possibilities 
 
The network of actors involved in the proposed SIB financed intervention in Site B had a 
longer history in their respective area than that in Site A. In Site B, the network included a 
committed assemblage of advocates for Social Prescribing led by a group of senior doctors 
who were perceived as being professionally and academically credible. These individuals had 
good local links with primary and secondary care organisations, some held healthcare 
commissioning and provider roles and they had very well defined links with local voluntary 
care organisations. These actors instigated the work on the SIB application. This network of 
Social Prescribing enthusiasts had spent over two decades working to demonstrate the 
clinical, social, operational and financial effectiveness of Social Prescribing. They were 
skilled at forging relationships with regional and national policy makers and funding councils 
to generate the finance to further the Social Prescribing agenda. The attractions of the SIB 
model for these local actors were three-fold: first, it would allow them to scale up Social 
Prescribing in their city to a greater number of patients; second, it would generate long term 
funding for the service over a proposed time period of 5-7 years (as opposed to the shorter, 
annually funded grants for previous, smaller scale projects); and thirdly, the SIB model also 
offered an exciting research opportunity to further the cause of Social Prescribing because it 
encourages counterfactual measurement to demonstrate attribution to generate outcomes-
related payments.  
 
Nevertheless, similar dilemmas (Bevir & Rhodes, 2007) around conflicts of interest in the 
commissioning processes of a SIB financed intervention highlighted in Site A emerged here 
too. In contrast to Site A, where stories of tension between network actors and local 
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governance procedures that emphasised rigidity and a commitment to competitive tendering 
prevailed, in Site B, the narratives emanating from network actors highlighted collaboration, 
innovation, risk taking and enduring commitment to flexibility in order to overcome these 
dilemmas.  A sense of a joint commitment to the project comes through from interviews with 
actors within the network. The dominant discursive sentiment is one of possibility and 
determination.  
 
As mentioned, in Site B, the informant interviews touched on similar ‘conflicts of interest’ 
noted in Site A. For example, as with Site A, numerous actors reported that there were 
concerns about how commissioning a SIB, and the requisite early and ongoing provider-
commissioner collaborations therein, ran counter to the traditions of competitive 
commissioning values. However, the stories developed by actors in Site B recounted a local 
determination to suspend the usual commissioning arrangements, and commission the service 
as an exception to standard rules. For instance, informants talked of how the ‘standard’ NHS 
contracting processes had to be sidestepped to commission and initiate this programme. This 
clearly contrasts with the narratives in Site A which emphasised procedural adherence, and 
relational breakdowns and a lack of trust amongst network partners. The narratives related to 
these issues in Site B emphasised ‘possibilities’ and flexibility: 
 ‘[N]ormally the contract is the contract, and the contract is, is not flexible but the 
idea of a contract’s not to be flexible. You know, it is to create that black and white, 
whereas with, with [this SIB programme], you know, there’s a lot of grey’ 
Commissioner, Site B 
In contrast to Site A – where narratives focused on contractual rigidity and a desire to follow 
‘classically right’ processes in relation to public sector procurement traditions to avoid 
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perceptions of conflicts of interest, in Site B we find narratives that emphasise suspension of 
usual commissioning rules or regulations –  contractual ‘greyness’ or doing things ‘back to 
front’ – guided by the desires of community and voluntary voices using their situated agency 
to persuade other actors of the value of the proposed project and a desire to generate the 
finance from social investors: 
‘We would never [normally] procure a service the way that we have done this [time], 
with actually someone coming to us [as commissioners] and… [Saying] “this is 
something we want to do, this is the way of getting funding, if we go this route we’ll 
find the social investors for you”.  So they came to us with a package, and [a senior 
commissioner] was enlightened enough to say, “let’s go for this, let’s work with them 
and try and see if this’ll work”… I’ve always said [this Social Prescribing Service] 
was not procured in the normal route, it was back to front, it was ground up from the, 
the community itself saying this is what we want, and the voluntary sector 
organisations organised themselves and came to us.’ 
Commissioner, Site B 
Whilst this commissioner highlighted unease about commissioning the service in this way, 
and spoke of legal concerns (which were reviewed with senior NHS commissioning 
regulatory bodies before proceeding) – the network ultimately overcame this unease 
collectively. An important difference between the two sites is the local development of a 
‘prime-contractor’ model, effectively co-commissioning the service between the 
commissioners and the voluntary group in Site B. This was led by locally established and 
credible figures who already had the trust of key network partners.   Additionally, no existing 
providers were set to lose out as the proposed SIB financed service was additive (in its 
absence there was no existing major SPS provision). Furthermore, there was little threat of 
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large external providers bidding for local contracts (as no such providers exist in Social 
Prescribing – in contrast to End of Life Care) – so unlike in Site A, local providers in Site B 
were less inclined to feel threatened by the proposed SIB financed intervention. These 




We explored, in two different sites in detail, how, when and why dilemmas (Bevir & Rhodes, 
2007) linked to efforts to design and commission healthcare services through a SIB financing 
mechanism either became unsurmountable or were overcome. We did this through an 
interpretation of the interactions of networks of actors within their specific historical and 
local contexts. This work builds on broader network governance approaches (Newman, 2001; 
Osborne, 2006) to explore the specificities of inter-organisational relationships in localised 
contexts. 
We used a ‘decentred’ approach to network governance (Bevir & Rhodes, 2007; Bevir & 
Richards, 2009) to explore whether, and if so, how, and to what extent, specific local 
traditions were challenged by new ideas or beliefs linked to these two respective SIB-
financed interventions. In each site, actors identified two distinct service and finance failures. 
One service failure related to End of Life Care, the other a lack of Social Prescribing. SIB 
financing was attractive in both cases as it offered a way to respond to these failures at pace 
and at scale. However, the SIB mechanism required a focus on early and ongoing integrated 
multi-actor service re-design that posed dilemmas for the governance of the networks of 
actors in both sites. Existing beliefs around ‘fairness’, competition and collaboration, 
coalesced within network narratives around the response to the dilemmas articulated in these 




Actors within networks locally negotiate new ideas and dilemmas within existing traditions 
and belief systems. Governance is locally reproduced through the narratives of these situated 
agents (Bevir & Rhodes, 2007). Different narratives were developed by actors in each site – 
we interpreted these narratives to develop overall stories from each site around the process of 
the proposed interventions. The comparative purchase is rendered through the local 
differences – these in turn are linked to local historical and contextual issues.  
 
The approach taken in Site A was conservative, reflecting the prior ‘traditions’, and sought to 
minimise the perceptions of any conflict of interest within a ‘difficult’ local network of 
actors. A governance approach was developed that emphasised ‘fairness’ and a reliance upon 
rigid norms of provider competition above all else.  Here, a desire to do what was ‘classically 
right’ on the part of the network actors emerged as the overriding story from the collected 
informant narratives. The dilemma faced by the network, was in how to reconcile the 
collaborative nature of SIB service redesign processes and the knowledge disparities this 
generates between different organisations, with the competitive service tendering traditions 
that most actors felt guaranteed a ‘fair’ process. The ultimate outcome was consistent with 
the beliefs and traditions of the historical context as reproduced by actors – in this case, a 
reverence for the traditions of competitive tendering. The result of the tendering process in 
Site A was that no compliant bids were received - therefore the service could not be 
commissioned. What mattered most here was that the process was deemed to be fair and 




In Site B informant narratives identified an equally prevalent, traditional belief in competitive 
tendering, however, these beliefs were challenged by a desire derived through the network of 
actors to govern in a more collaborative and less firmly rule bound manner. Local actors’ 
beliefs were sufficiently altered by the promise of delivering Social Prescribing at scale 
through a SIB so as to accommodate a shift from the traditions of competitive commissioning 
of health services to a practice with greater flexibility.  The dilemma posed by some of the 
anticompetitive collaborative implications of SIB commissioning was ultimately overcome. 
The narratives around the significant breakdown in network relations discussed by actors at 
Site A contrasted with narrative reproductions of a deeply committed network at Site B built 
on longer-term, trusting relationships amongst actors – this is evocative of the PPP principles 
identified by Teicher et al (2006). The story that emerged at Site B was one that emphasised 
taking a chance and getting things done. In this sense, Site B overcame the dilemma of how 
the inherent collaborative neo-corporatist (Osborne, 2006) elements of SIB commissioning 
makes traditional NPM style (Ferlie et al, 1996)  NHS competitive tendering problematic.  
  
There are a number of historical and contextual factors that are significant in explaining the 
divergences found in these sites. First, is a factor that Bevir & Rhodes (2001) refer to as the 
‘continuation of the activity of governing.’ In Site A, End of Life Care services are essential 
and not optional, therefore the relationships between actors within the network must remain 
functional at all times because if not, then extremely vulnerable patients may suffer. Hence 
the significance of the narrative of existing providers, fearful for their futures, ‘breathing 
down the necks’ of commissioners. This was not an issue at Site B, where Social Prescribing 
Services were deemed optional as opposed to essential, with clear implication for the 
relational dynamics between different network actors. This may have implications beyond 
these cases – SIB financed interventions may be more likely to be initiated where they avoid 
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the continuation of the activity of governing – i.e. they may be better suited to establishing 
additive, non-essential services as opposed to replacing existing essential ones. 
 
Secondly, in Site B, efforts were made to ensure that local provider organisations would share 
in the delivery of the new services if and when they were commissioned – this contrasted 
with Site A, where there was great fear that existing actors may lose out to a large national 
charity that had not previously operated in the local area. This finding might suggest that 
SIBs are more likely to be initiated where they work with existing local providers rather than 
threatening them – once more highlighting neo-corporatist values (Osborne, 2006). 
 
Thirdly, the professional and academic legitimacy of local policy champions and the 
historical legacy of prior reform efforts are significant. In Site B, there were over 20 years of 
consistent efforts from powerful actors consistently striving for the delivery of Social 
Prescribing at scale.  The initiation of the SIB in this area reflects the strongly established 
relationships and mutual trust within the local network. In contrast, at Site A, less established 
actors without local roots lacked such professional legitimacy and had not demonstrated the 
same local effort to convince other local actors of the utility of the SIB financing mechanism 
to deliver the End of Life Care reforms. This finding highlights the importance of localised 
professional and jurisdictional power, as well as the significance of time in developing trust 
amongst agents within networks.  
 
In terms of the broader implications of this research, with respect to the theoretical debate 
around the governance implications of SIBs, our contribution is to highlight the potential for 
a decentred approach to take a ‘bottom up’ view of how networks negotiate the competing 
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logics of national policy initiatives. In an English healthcare context, SIBs encourage the 
construction of an early and enduring new network of actors to explore local policy issues 
collaboratively - explicitly aiming to develop new ideas and challenge existing practices. 
Such efforts at SIB development highlight tensions between the logics of competition and 
collaboration in the traditions, or governance of local commissioning. SIB development 
encourages pre-contractual collaboration between actors, signalling a form of re-integration 
of commissioning and provision of services in the shape of informal local PPPs (Osborne, 
2006; Dunleavy et al, 2006; Joy & Shields, 2013; Bovaird, 2004).  
 
Finally, this paper empirically highlights the ongoing tensions between different health and 
social policy initiatives pursued by governments in the UK since the early 1990s and more 
generalizable challenges of commissioning services, especially in low competition contexts. 
Efforts to integrate health and social care services in England occur within a contested milieu 
in which local actors must accommodate the competitive logics of the 1990s quasi-market 
reforms (Ferlie et al, 1996) and the Health and Social Care Act 2012 initiatives, alongside 
emergent collaborative logics emphasised by SIBs and outcomes based commissioning 
approaches (Joy & Shield, 2013).  Local networks of actors have to negotiate these 
‘sedimented’ governance logics (Jones, 2017) to deliver what is desired by national 
government, what the law allows (as they interpret it) and what they wish to do locally for 
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Table 1: Local Policy Failures  
Site  Local policy failures that led to SIB proposal 
A  Service failure: Poor End of Life Care arrangements overall with lack of 
coordination at specific points, resulting in overburdening of services, poor 
quality  patient outcomes and increased local service costs 
 
 Finance failure: Lack of local finance to remedy these failings rapidly 
 
 
B  Service failure: Large co-morbid population poorly catered for, resulting in 
overburdening of services, poor quality patient outcomes and increased local 
service costs 
 
 Finance Failure: Lack of local finance to scale up promising local pilot work 
over the past two decades 
 
